The most recent round of fighting in the
Middle East has caught the world’s attention and inspired activism on both
sides perhaps even moreso than usual, due to high causalities and the effect of
social media, which is pumping harrowing images from Gaza into ever-more
people’s homes and making comment far easier.
As a result, a consensus seems to have built
against Israel’s recent offensive in Gaza. At the fringes of this backlash we also
find worrying evidence
of anti-Semitism, demonstrated clearly by a spike in attacks on Jewish
communities in Britain and France, and sometimes more subtlety by loaded
allegations of “bloodthirstiness”, “Holocausts” etc by Israel from certain
commenters. On the other side, a vocal minority in Europe, and many more in
America, remain staunchly supportive of all of Israel’s actions, and as usual
some of these seem willing to conflate even nuanced criticisms of Israeli
actions
with anti-Semitism (this well-written blog provided a fair and
useful guide on distinctions, for both
sides to follow).
Black and white reactions, in a conflict that
has and always will be cloaked in shades of grey, are often unhelpful. Both
sides have broken ceasefires and sabotaged peace deals. Yesterday, a 3-day ceasefire
was scuttled when Hamas took an Israeli soldier hostage after just 3 hours,
prompting a renewed Israeli assault in order to get him back. Let’s look at
both sides.
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From Flickr |
As defenders highlight, Israel is a generally
liberal democracy in a region that boasts few others. It is a country that originally
withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005 in the spirit of peace, but nevertheless finds
itself under constant attack from well-armed terror groups and nearby regimes
that funnel weapons to them. It is a country where rights are broadly upheld,
where Arabic is an official language (along with Hebrew) and where the entire
society was built on social
democratic values
(this includes its mutualised public health
system,
which also works with the Palestinian Authority to treat some Palestinians too).
However, examples can be found where Israel’s
actions in defence of its citizens can be utilitarian or less than liberal. The
heavy civilian losses in its assaults on Gaza now and in 2009, as well as in
Lebanon in 2006, are among the more recent examples. Israel’s blockade of Gaza
since 2005, while at its core a pragmatic response to Hamas’ cynical
willingness to smuggle in weapons and use the Strip as a springboard for
attacks, can also appear excessive at times.
Then, there’s the issue of the second-class treatment
of Arab Israelis
within its own borders, acknowledged even by past Israeli government
commissions. Some Israelis have been known to point out that Arabs are still freer
in Israel than they would be elsewhere in the region, especially if female or
gay, but this is still not an excuse. Moreover, the situation Arab Israelis
face has become considerably more desperate in recent weeks due to rising tensions and
racist attacks
from far-right Jewish Israelis in country. The “Sderot
cinema” story, too, was chilling.
And perhaps most important of all, as commendable as the 2005 Gaza withdrawal was, Israel long ago squandered much of
the goodwill it earned from that by continuing to build more and more settlements
in the West Bank, knowingly making one of the biggest obstacles to a peaceful two-state solution ever-harder
to surmount.
For it to be a true member of the liberal
democratic community of nations, all of these things can and should be
scrutinised, something both Anglo-American Israel hawks and the Israeli
government itself need to accept.
However, a Tom Doran post in the Independent, while unreasonable in some
of its remarks and allegations, recently made one valid point about Britain’s own
history in Northern Ireland, noting that this was “a profound test of the British
state…not passed with flying colours” (internment, Bloody Sunday, collusion
etc). While this was something for Brits to be “ashamed” of he said, Doran
argued it also had to be considered in historical context and in light of “the
toll random attacks on civilians take on a society [and] the impossible choices
asymmetric warfare forces on governments”. With regard to the Middle East, Doran
reasoned that criticism must similarly take into account “Israel’s real
choices”.
Moderate critics have called for Israel to
take “greater steps” to prevent civilian
casualties. As I read the horrifying accounts from Gaza and see the casualty
figures, I can’t help but reach for the same reaction. But this in one of those
times in politics when it’s not enough to just criticise someone’s chosen
course of action without actually suggesting a viable alternative.
Realistically, what more steps could Israel take, exactly?
While I suspect there are instances in which
Israeli soldiers become careless or indifferent about loss of life, for the
most part, I believe the IDF acts with professionalism, gathers the best
intelligence it can and agonizes over strikes. Even human rights groups have noted that the IDF increasingly now
uses leaflet
drops, texts, phone calls and non-explosive “scare” bombs to warn Palestinian
civilians of incoming strikes (although those groups have stopped short of
saying this removes legal liability from Israel when civilian casualties still
occur, as they inevitably sometimes do in the fog of urban warfare).
Meanwhile, Hamas have fired 2,968 rockets
into Israel in July 2014 alone and knowingly use
populated areas, mosques, hospitals and schools to hide or fire weapons. Israel
has now also discovered they use some of these sites as the entrances to tunnels, used to protect
Hamas leaders or stage attacks on Israeli citizens. Hamas is designated as a
terror organisation by both the Foreign Office and the EU, operates from a
virulently illiberal Islamic fundamentalist ideology and is obligated by
charter
to kill Jews and destroy Israel.
Despite all this, direct criticism of Hamas
seems somewhat muted in the West at the moment, at least relative to the outcry
over Israel’s actions. To be fair, this is often (though not always) based on a
feeling that our condemnation of Hamas is implicit or redundant, while Israel is
expected to live up to a higher standard, in a sense a recognition of Israel’s
inherent virtue and liberalism. But this still brings us back to Doran’s question
of Israel’s “real choices”.
Yes, Israel should combat anti-Arab racism, pinpoint target
its strikes and blockades as much as possible, and halt (or preferably reverse)
settlement building in the West Bank. That much is more than reasonable, and
Israel’s failure to do so undercuts both its own cause and its long-term
security in any case. To do all that, Israelis will also have to elect
a less hardline leadership next time. Since the January
2013 elections, PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition has included both his own
right-wing Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu alliance and the far-right Jewish Home, with only the second-ranked
centrists Yesh Atid and the smaller Hatnuah providing a moderating
influence from within. While we’re at it, although the Palestinian vote
for Hamas in 2006 was probably more of a rejection of the one-party corruption
of the ruling Fatah than a wholehearted endorsement of extremism, Palestinians will
do themselves few favours if they don’t vote far more wisely next
time.
But again, right now, what are the Israelis expected
to do when Hamas rains thousands of rockets down on their country? If our
answer is “sit there and take it, or we’d have to condemn you” or “only a few
of yours have died and you’ve got the Iron Dome, stop overreacting”, we are
both giving a free pass to attempted murder and being far more blasé than most
of us would ever be if it was our own country under threat. The IDF’s
provocative “what
would you do?” Tweets, imagining an equivalent threat to Britain and
showing missiles hitting London, resonated with me for this reason.
Once this current round of fighting is finally
over and peace talks are (hopefully) renewed, Israel’s failures to compromise
can and should be scrutinised. But right this minute, Israel’s real choice
isn’t whether or not to kill civilians. It is whether to
let its own citizens die by refusing to deal with Hamas on the one hand, or to
risk killing Palestinians by striking Hamas targets in self-defence on the
other, a much tougher decision.
What would you do?
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