It’s hard to
imagine a larger contrast between the upbeat pre-election blog I posted here on
Wednesday and the one I sadly have to write today. Thursday’s election was an unmitigated disaster
for Labour, as well as for the Liberal Democrats and large parts of the pundit
class. It was a triumph for David Cameron, as he won a small overall Tory majority
– their first since 1992 - against the expectations of most commentators
(though not quite all – voices such as Dan
Hodges have been predicting it for quite some time, and we’ll be mad if
we don’t listen to them from now on).
The SNP also
prospered of course, nearly sweeping the board in Scotland on extraordinarily
large swings and decapitating multiple ‘big beasts’ from both Labour and the
Lib Dems. But as bad as it was, all that was telegraphed long enough in advance
that we were at least able to ‘price it in’ to our expectations for the night
to some degree. By contrast, Labour’s near-total failure to make compensating
gains in even some of the lowest-hanging Lab-Con marginals like Nuneaton was
anything but inevitable. Further salt in the wound were the sudden losses this
time in narrow 2010 Labour defences like Southampton Itchen (where I spent
polling day five years ago) and Ed Balls’ own seat of Morley & Outwood,
which had been the frontline where Labour thwarted an outright Tory
breakthrough back then. Labour only took 232 seats - even if Labour had held
every seat in Scotland, the Tories still would have had their majority based on
these English results. Labour will need to win almost 100 seats in one go in
2020 to form even the narrowest of majorities.
Nor was the
sheer scale of the Lib Dem collapse in England expected, something which proved
to be very much a double-edged sword for Labour. I spent most of Thursday and
the early hours of Friday morning in Bermondsey & Old Southwark, where
Hughes’ legendary personal vote meant it was reasonable to expect either a
successful Lib Dem defence or a wafer-thin Labour gain. In the event, at around
4am it was officially announced that our candidate Neil Coyle had skilfully
converted an 8,500 majority for Hughes into a 4,500 vote Labour win, bringing
unbridled jubilation and much-needed relief to the activists there after the
demoralising 10pm exit poll and hours of dire returns from the rest of the country.
However, Labour had been tacitly reliant on centre-left Lib Dem defectors only
handing over these sorts of Lib-Lab urban marginals, while continuing to prop
up Lib Dem incumbents in seats where the Tories were the challenger. Most
commentators had anticipated this would have left the Lib Dems with 25 seats and
help deprive the Tories of the majority they secured. Instead, we saw the Lib
Dems crash all the way down to eight, with figures like Vince Cable, Ed Davey
and David Laws swept away in a blue tide.
Amid all this,
there are plenty of lessons that sorely need to be learned.
1.
No more truck with failing
leaders
As Phillip
Collins argued in The Times
yesterday, some fundamental rules of politics are
unbreakable – one such rule is that a party won’t win while trailing badly on
both leadership and economic competence.
I still like
Ed Miliband – I believe he is a moral and well-intentioned man of great intellect,
who even by the cut-throat standards of politics has shown incredible resilience
in the face of brutal personal attacks (“I will put up with whatever they throw
at me in order to fight for you” was one of his best lines). In the short campaign
he was personable and passionate, beating expectations and drawing praise from
many previous critics. He had more mettle than many gave him credit for -
rarely for an opposition leader, he was able to shift the national narrative on
phone hacking and energy market reform (and on Syria, though I disagreed with
him there at the time). He initiated a process of renewal in Labour that
overhauled the party’s operations and saw the quiet beginnings of a fused ‘New
& Blue Labour’ ideological trend emerge in the party. And yesterday
morning, he took a tough result on the chin, accepting sole responsibility and
resigning with dignity.
But in
politics, widely-held perceptions or set narratives can be indistinguishable
from reality, hard to change once accepted by the press and public. You may
well get only one chance to make a first impression, and from day one of his
leadership, Ed Miliband never instinctively struck the public as naturally “prime
ministerial”. He was maligned as “weird” or straw-manned as “Red Ed”. Critics harped about the manner of his selection, against his front-running elder
brother and reliant on the trade union section of the electoral college. He
never led David Cameron on leadership at any point in the last five years, and
while it is true that strong performances on the campaign trail lifted Ed’s
ratings significantly from what they had been, the sardonic assessment of one
of the Labour characters in Channel 4’s Ballot
Monkeys (“Ed has all the confidence of a man whose leadership ratings have
just rocketed to minus 19”) unfortunately wasn’t far from the truth. Some of
Ed’s defenders cited the precedent of Thatcher, who won despite trailing
Callaghan in polls on leadership in 1979, but this was the singular exception
that proved an ironclad rule (voters were also immeasurably more change-hungry
in ’79, and I’d wonder if initial scepticism about Thatcher was partly just down
to the pervasive sexism of the era). And above all else, every single minute
and moment we exhausted defending Ed’s leadership were ones when we should have
been explaining our substantive agenda for the country instead – the leader should
make the case for their party, not the other way around.
Labour also knew
all of this. It’s why Ed suffered repeated leadership wobbles throughout his
time as leader, most notably in November 2014 when speculation about a rebel
coup or an Alan Johnson coronation hit fever-pitch. But as in Gordon Brown’s
time and in sharp contrast to the ruthless Tory and Lib Dem leadership putsches
we’ve seen in times gone by, Labour plots tend to spill onto the front pages
without ever actually reaching fruition, condemning us to the worst of both
worlds – we publicly appeared divided and Ed was further undermined, but there
was no chance of him actually being replaced. I must admit that it crossed my
mind at that time that a quick Alan Johnson or Andy Burnham coronation might well
have been the best thing for the party, but as it became clear to me that the plotters
were just as gutless or disorganised as Brown’s tormentors had been, I became
sympathetic to the #WeBackEd hashtag campaign on Twitter. There was simply no
sense in disunity without result, and it was clear to me that come what may, Ed
was the only person actually brave enough to lead Labour into the 2015
election.
The lesson of
all this is clear – we need to reform our party rules to make leadership
challenges at times of crisis somewhat easier, as the institutional barriers
for a challenge from the PLP are simply too high at current (though reforms
will need to be measured - constant, destabilising “leadership
spills” in Australia suggest that the other extreme isn’t desirable
either). In exchange, worthy internal opponents of any embattled future Labour
leaders need to make a firm choice when they sense the party is on course to
lose – break cover and set out your stall, or just shut up and campaign.
Self-promotional briefing from the shadows is worse than useless.
2.
“It’s [still] the economy,
stupid”
Economic
competence is an even tougher question - it’s an impression that people take
from the entire party and its past history, rather than one we can hope to
shift simply with a change of personnel. But except for a brief window in 2012
in the wake of the Omnishambles budget, Labour never had the initiative here
and always trailed badly. Without it, it’s actually hard to comprehend why we
ever thought we would win.
To my mind, the
2015 Labour manifesto did hit most of the right notes here from a pure policy
standpoint – Miliband and Balls pledged not to borrow and to cut the deficit
every year, they made these pledges subject to a budget lock, they promised not
to raise income taxes or NI for the vast majority of people and they rolled out
sensible pro-business policies (freezing business rates, a pledge for the
lowest corporation tax rate in the G7 even after a small rise to fund the
business rate cut, a British Investment Bank, continued EU membership,
long-termist infrastructure planning etc). At least by the time of the
election, the charge that “Red Ed” had abandoned the centre-ground didn’t fully
make sense – this was perhaps evidenced by the coordinated fire he had to put
up with from the anti-austerity Sturgeon-Wood-Bennett axis in both of his
leaders’ debates.
It’s also true
that any Labour leader would have struggled to respond to constant Tory attacks
tethering them to the 2008 crash and the subsequent deficit. Labour essentially
lost that argument in the 2010 election, before Ed was even leader. David
Miliband, Ed Balls and Andy Burnham were all senior faces in Brown’s
government, so the “don’t give the keys back to the people who crashed the car”
logic the Conservatives have hammered could still have applied to any of Labour’s
plausible 2010 leadership candidates. The response Ed seemed to settle on was
economically sound (apologising for failing to regulate the banks, defending
the deficit as a necessary evil post-crisis and pledging to reduce it at a
managed pace once the economy had begun to grow). However, that response died
on its feet in the political arena because of its inherent nuance – it can come
across as a dodge, and saying “we weren’t wrong to run up a deficit, but I will
cut it” can sound contradictory on its face.
Tory messaging,
meanwhile, has been both thoroughly hypocritical and economically illiterate (they
pushed for more bank deregulation, Osborne backed Labour’s spending plans in
2007, Osborne later used Quantitative Easing after denouncing it in 2009, the
Tories themselves left a post-Black Wednesday deficit to Labour in 1997, they
have missed their own deficit targets, and they went on an uncosted splurge
during this election campaign). But unfortunately, the Conservative moral
narrative of “cleaning up the mess” and demanding that Labour apologise for the
deficit cut through easily in both this election and in 2010, down to its
instinctiveness and (over) simplicity. And it’s also a rule that if the public
feel strongly enough that an incumbent government is doing a decent enough job
with the economy, it is hard for the opposition to make weather, whatever its
message may be (the old mantra of “oppositions don’t win elections, governments
lose them”).
But having
said all of that, the size of the task simply meant that Labour’s only slim
chance of success was to approach the issue with the same level of monotonous
message discipline the Tories have. In his first conference speech in September
2010, Ed did praise New Labour’s pro-business focus and backed the need for
cuts under the Darling deficit reduction plan, but these were brief passages and
weren’t followed up consistently throughout last the last five years. Ed
addressed the anti-austerity ‘March
for the Alternative’ in March 2011, hoping to harness popular anger, but this undermined the idea that we
were a serious party of government. Labour kept vaguely acknowledging that it
would’ve been making cuts had it been in government, but it has not been in enough
of a coordinated manner, and it was inconsistent with the fact that Labour
often appeared to take an oppositional stance to almost all actual coalition
spending cuts. The clearest messaging on deficit reduction was seen to come at
the time of the 2015 manifesto launch, but it’s hard to shift existing
impressions at that late stage. And Ed sometimes struggled to reconcile his case for
a more moral economy (e.g. his ‘predators and producers’ conference speech in
2011) and support for tax rises at the upper end with the simultaneous need for
a positive pro-growth, pro-aspiration message.
In contrast,
some have pointed to David Miliband’s 2010 ‘conference speech that never was’
(leaked to the Guardian in 2011),
which put a clear narrative on wealth creation and deficit reduction front and
centre as a statement of intent. While the sudden speculation about David
returning to the UK for the leadership is probably baseless (and should be
ignored even if not – he had his chance), the text of his speech gives a good
template for the next Labour leader’s economic message. Labour must read
it, and digest it.
More
generally, even lower-level Labour politicians and activists need to get out of
our comfort zone on these issues. Early last year, Karen Landles of the Labour
and Finance and Industry Group (LFIG) commented that Labour needs to talk about
wealth creation with at least as much passion as we do with the NHS – she was
absolutely right. Even if the next Labour leadership finds its voice on
business policy and fiscal restraint, we can’t just leave the heavy lifting
solely to them while sticking to our patter on public services and inequalities
whenever we find ourselves on the doorstep. Change must be total, top to bottom
and throughout the party. All CLPs must be issued talking points and given
seminars on these issues (and for that matter on others where we are struggling
to connect – immigration, welfare etc – but more on that under point 4).
There’s of
course a counter-charge that Labour may have suffered from sounding too similar
to the Tories on the economy in the eyes of the left, exacerbating the losses
to the SNP and allowing the Greens to split our vote. But in the end, Labour put
itself in a worst of both worlds position in this election – the message inevitably
wasn’t left enough for some SNP switchers or the 1.1 million who went Green, something
we couldn’t do much about (there’s no electoral majority there, even if they
did all stick with us). But at the very same time, the lack of discipline and
passion behind our message meant centrist swing voters in England also came
away resoundingly unconvinced that they could place their trust in us. In the
months and years ahead, we need to go full-bore to win back the latter group,
assuming it’s not too late to do so.
3.
The next leader probably
needs to be someone fresh
I’ll probably
blog about this separately soon, but clearly, Labour needs to think carefully
about its next leadership election. In spirit of summer 2010, and in contrast
to the stitch-ups of 1994 and 2007, it needs to invite all comers and have
spirited debate about the direction of the party. Timetabling will be a point
of discussion. Some will suggest a longer contest to allow more of an airing of
issues, but Labour might want to keep an eye on the timing of the Lib Dem and
UKIP leadership contests – there may be a case for beating them to the punch,
to establish momentum as the sole opposition to the Tories.
Many have
already said that Labour needs to move on to the 2010 generation, which I
basically agree with. Andy Burnham and Yvette Cooper are both strong in their
own ways, and I have great respect for them. I first-preferenced Burnham on my
ballot paper in 2010, and might well have voted for Cooper instead had she stood
then. It’s also true that they are known quantities with experience in
government, which Labour’s 2010 intake will lack. But Blair and Cameron had
similarly little experience, and it didn’t do them harm. Meanwhile, substantial
baggage from the New Labour era weighs Burnham and Cooper down – the same “they
crashed the car” problem on competence Ed faced, the memories of factional
infighting, their half-baked manoeuvres against Ed in this parliament, Cooper’s
inevitable association with her now-defeated husband (unfair and sexist though
that may be) and Burnham’s with the Mid Staffs hospital scandal. The new
generation are free of all this.
Of the newer
intake, Chuka Umunna and Dan Jarvis are the most heavily tipped, along with the
likes of Tristram Hunt, Stella Creasy and Liz Kendall (Rachel Reeves is also a
fantastic prospect, but she is on maternity leave and so may not wish to stand
right now). They come from a variety of backgrounds – several bring much-valued
experience from outside the ‘Westminster bubble’ - though all are thought to be
savvy political operators. Umunna, Hunt and Reeves formed a ‘praetorian guard’
around Ed during times of leadership trouble, which means they cannot be
accused of having publicly destabilised the party. And with Harriet Harman also
stepping down, perhaps Labour can now get two of them onto a ‘dream ticket’.
Labour has plenty of bright lights, and I think moving forward needs to involve
putting our faith in one of them.
4.
It’s all about England
(and Wales) now – New/Blue Labour is not an optional extra
Perhaps
depending on whether Cameron makes a big federalist offer to the SNP,
Scotland’s place in the union may well be imperilled by the double-whammy of
Nationalist hegemony in Scotland and an emboldened Tory majority in Westminster
with an unprecedented lack of electoral clout north of the border (Cameron has just
one Scottish MP - Thatcher started out with 22, Major 11). Even if Scotland
stays, it’s unclear how long it would take Scottish Labour to recover, so
Labour has to work from the basis that 40 seats up there we used to count on
are gone.
The one upshot
of all that is that it will focus the mind of the Labour Party on how to win in
England, without the mental comfort of our old Scottish crutch. In
1945, 1950, 1966, 1997, 2001 and 2005 Labour would’ve had an outright majority of
seats even
without Scotland - we need to rediscover how do that, but with greater
regularity than ever before. As an aside, much of the below also applies to Wales
– the Tories just had their best election
there in 30 years and UKIP gained notable ground in north
Wales.
Under the
guidance of Lord Maurice Glasman, Jon Cruddas MP, Jonathan Rutherford, Duncan
Weldon and Marc Stears, we saw elements of the Blue/One Nation Labour approach
being introduced into the party under Ed, where it was fused with some of the
best of New Labour thinking, with which it shares some common ground, and other further-left intellectual strains from within the party (here's a longer summary I wrote about Blue Labour in 2013). This led to
decentralisation, community empowerment, English national identity, a measured
approach to immigration, making work pay and welfare reform moving up somewhat in Labour’s internal debates and potential agenda, but the result
on Thursday makes plain that this went nowhere near far enough. Though UKIP
only won Clacton and Farage has now resigned, their second-place finishes in
some Labour seats put them in a good position to make future gains and it’s
probable that the party took enough white working-class 2010 Labour voters to
tip key Lab-Con battles to the Tories, including some seats we held in 2010. In
Southampton Itchen, held in 2010 by 192 votes, UKIP’s vote increased six-fold
and Eurosceptic Tory Royston Smith got in with a majority of 2,316, despite a
fall of over 7,500 in the Lib Dem vote and a concerted community
organising-based campaign by Southampton Labour and their fantastic candidate,
Rowenna Davis.
Itchen’s
outgoing Labour MP John Denham has argued for an English Labour Party to be
formally recognised in the party structure, which would be a good start. Making
St George’s Day a bank holiday and Jerusalem the official national anthem for
England have been suggested in a similar vein, and a few months ago at the time
of the leaders’ debates, I mooted
the idea of an England-only debate featuring appointed English
representatives from each party, alongside the local Welsh, Scottish and
Northern Ireland ones that were already taking place.
The party also
needs to be disciplined on immigration. Under Ed’s leadership, Labour has
focused on immigration much more as an issue, especially since the rise of UKIP
became apparent in early 2013, but this was too little too late in many
regards. Labour’s narrative remains essentially positive about immigration in
broad spec – as it should – but it is now more willing to engage the public
constructively, it is more pragmatic on overall numbers and firmer about
enforcement, benefits, wage undercutting and abuses in the system. This stance
is less restrictive than some of the public would like, which has been an
issue, but it represents the best balance the party can hope to strike.
However,
internal opposition means the party’s attempts to tackle the issue have been
two steps forward, one step back. Though the phrasing of our ‘Controls on immigration’
manifesto pledge could have been better, the very public outcry from sections
of the party about the “anti-immigration mug” in the midst of the campaign was
disproportionate and laid bare the unhelpful attitudes of many in the Labour
movement, undercutting the entire effort. A Labour councillor in Southampton
also commented to me that senior politicians from the London Labour Party need
to be far more mindful of how their remarks on immigration play in the rest of
the country. Labour made gains on Thursday in the capital and in other
metropolitan areas like Manchester, where UKIP aren’t a factor, but badly almost
everywhere else in England – a governing majority cannot be won this way. That
exact pattern was also heavily foreshadowed a year ago in the May 2014 European
and local elections, suggesting that Labour’s efforts in the past 12 months did
little to shift the tide. The party’s language on immigration – and our
approach to politics in general – needs to permit variance and strike people as
less ‘metropolitan liberal’ if the One Nation ideal is to succeed (and I say
that as a member of Islington South CLP).
Another big
running sore is devolution and the linked issue of English Votes for English
Needs (EVEN) – here, the party could do with hashing it out internally and
adopting clear, radical proposals. Ed’s twisting in the wind last September on
this, falling back on the outcome of a ‘Constitutional Convention’ that many
probably took as a politician’s wheeze, did the party absolutely no favours. We
need to answer UKIP and the Tories with an alternative vision. I’m personally
sceptical of a singular English Parliament being our version of this, as one
centralised legislature for 45-53 million people might well answer the question
of English national identity, but would utterly fail to empower England’s
distinctive regions and counties. However, regionalisation without a unified
legislature would threaten English national identity, especially if justice,
culture and perhaps tax were devolved areas. Members of elected regional
assemblies could perhaps sit at certain times as an ‘English parliament’ to
decide on reserved national matters, but another arguable factor with regional
assemblies is the need to remember their 2004 rejection and the voters’ John
Major test (“if the answer is more politicians, you’re asking the wrong
question”). Mark Ferguson’s proposal for English Westminster MPs to also double
as regional assembly members might instead meet this requirement, but that
would draw fire from unionists rightfully wary of converting the Commons into a
part-time English Parliament. And somewhere in all this, we would need to
decide where English local government (which might yet need unitarising), cities,
the fledgling Combined Authorities and Greater London would fit in to this
puzzle. But no more kicking the can down the road - England needs an answer.
All in all,
Renie Anjeh put it best recently in pre-election blog for
Labour Uncut – between the loss of Scotland and how well the Tories (and in
votes, UKIP) did in this election, “Labour must talk to England: it’s not an
option, it’s an imperative”. That means the continuation and development of a Blue-New
Labour fusion, until it is undeniably rooted in the party and its ethos.
5.
Labour needs to sort out
its line on Europe, fast
In the last
parliament, there was a debate as to whether Labour should find a way to
support an In/Out EU referendum. John Mills’ Labour for a Referendum, a
handful of backbenchers, a few voices at the top of party (notably Jon Cruddas)
and outright majorities of voters and Labour supporters were receptive to the need
for one. Voters have never had a say on the EU in its current form, so granting
popular demands for a referendum would’ve put Labour party back in touch with
people on an issue that effects their sense of their own national identity, and
probably helped prevent further slippage to UKIP and the Tories. I also believe
that between cross-party and business support for ‘In’, the public’s status quo
caution in referenda and the strength of the arguments that exist for our EU
membership, such a referendum could genuinely be won. Recent
polls have shown support for ‘In’ outpacing support for ‘Out’, a
turnaround that has probably been aided by Nigel Farage’s toxification of the
anti-EU cause. I wrote a blog on this subject in 2013.
However, Ed remained
unsupportive, reflecting a very large section of the party’s instinctive centralising
pro-Europeanism (Tony Blair and his followers, while proven right almost
categorically in their pre-election assessment of our strategy on Thursday, are
no different here). These voices feared a referendum would harm the
recovery through investor uncertainty or an outright withdrawal, undercut the
party’s clearest offer to business and distract an incoming Labour government
from the rest of its agenda. These concerns all made perfect sense in and of
themselves, and Ed was very candid on the campaign trail about a referendum not
being his priority. But we woke up on Friday to a Conservative majority with a
clear mandate for its promised EU referendum in 2017, kicking off a two-year
battle to keep us in the EU. And Labour – both the supposed ‘people’s party’
and the only ‘party of In’ that matters - will now have to enter the coming
debate after vocally opposing it even taking place.
An incoming
Labour leader needs to accept we were on the wrong side of the issue and
apologise for the well-intentioned failure to embrace the referendum (if the
bookies are right and it is Andy Burnham, then this pivot wouldn’t be too hard
- he was one of the shadow cabinet advocates of a referendum). Labour and the
broader pro-European movement, in all parties and none, then needs to build a
strong, coordinated campaign. We badly need to learn the lessons of the
Scottish referendum, where the Yes Scotland side were all too able to lambast
Better Together as “Project Fear” for its overwhelming negativity and lack of a
clear, positive case for the union. And we should remember that the margin for
error is even smaller here – important though it is, British presence in the EU
is nowhere near as integral as the continuance of the UK should have been for
Scots. We need to grab the coming referendum with both hands and hone our arguments.
However,
another lesson from both the Scotland referendum and UKIP’s successes against
Labour is that we will need to carefully manage our language. The Labour
leadership will campaign for an ‘In’ vote, and will do so with the support of
most of the party. But we must be mindful that the Labour movement has long
been home to a proud Eurosceptic tradition that speaks for a large section of
our working-class vote, the sort of people we have already started losing to
the likes of ‘Red UKIP’. We must find a way to accommodate these voices within
our movement as we go forward into the EU referendum. If we don’t, the horror
we witnessed in Scotland serves as a warning – during the independence
referendum, Labour alienated many ex-Labour Yes voters by failing to appear
respectful of their priorities, pushing them firmly into the SNP column
thereafter.
That’s where one
of the often-overlooked policy shifts we saw in Ed Miliband’s leadership may
come in, if maintained and built upon by his successor. As Telegraph columnist Peter
Oborne noted in 2011, in the past few years, Labour has started to find
a somewhat more Eurosceptic voice. This is not a betrayal of our party’s
internationalist values in my eyes – I’m pro-EU, but healthy scepticism is part
and parcel of refusing to be painted as subscribing to an unquestioning
‘Europhile’ creed that few Britons will ever share. We’re the Labour Party, not
the Liberal Democrats.
And so Ed
Miliband’s Labour opposed a rise in the EU Commission budget, instead proposing
an outright cut, and demanded that British exposure to Portuguese bail-out be
limited. Labour opposed both main Commission President candidates in 2014 – the
centre-right’s Jean-Claude Juncker and Labour’s own Party of European
Socialists candidate Martin Schulz – as too integrationist. It backed a ‘red
card’ reform than would make it easier for member-state national parliaments to
veto European legislation. Ed did pledge an In/Out referendum in the unlikely event
of a treaty change. It raised the alarm about the effect TTIP could have had on
public services, and shadow health secretaries John Healey and Andy Burnham
mounted critiques of NHS competition that potentially involved defying EU
competition law. The party accepted that the lack of transition controls on
Eastern European migration had been an error, and Labour’s manifesto pledge on
immigration included putting the party’s pledge to ban benefits for EU migrants
for two years front and centre, with Labour frontbenchers taking to defending
“free movement of labour, not free
movement of benefits”. As a result of these sorts of shifts, Jonathan
Lindsell of the think-tank Civitas recently
noted that in Labour’s 2015 manifesto, “Labour’s EU reform promises
resemble those of Eurosceptic parties, only diluted and couched in workers’
rights terms”. These stands are an acknowledgement of the deep public feeling that
Brussels is distant and far from perfect, in need of reform and should not grow
ever-bigger. They will be critical to us making a case that ‘In’ doesn’t mean ‘no
change’, as Labour had so badly wished to do in the Scottish referendum.
Having said
all that, Labour is also not the Conservative Party – we are not gripped by a
pathological Europhobic obsession that makes governing with a small Commons majority
nigh-on impossible (good luck with that, Cameron) and divorces them from the
real-world implications of a withdrawal from the EU. Having to fight the
referendum may yet tear the Conservatives apart and trigger a second UKIP surge
at their expense. Labour will be largely unified, as we are able to recognise that
though it could be better, the EU is overall a great deal for Britain. It gives
us access to a huge market that supports 3 million British jobs, safeguards our
employment rights, allows us to tackle cross-border security challenges and enhances
our proud position as a world-leading nation. In 2006, shortly after becoming
Tory leader, David Cameron sought to his balance his party’s natural
Atlanticism with a desire not to stand too close to the Bush White House, and
so pledged a “steadfast, but not slavish” relationship with the US. We should
appropriate those as Labour’s watchwords on the EU, in the coming referendum
and beyond.
Conclusions
Labour has re-founded itself in the past
and fought back in tough times - we will find our way back to power sooner or
later. But our last spell in opposition involved four lost elections and
eighteen years in the wilderness. This time we have already lost two, the second of
which was arguably winnable. The next five years will
be painful, and as the official opposition Labour will need to continue to
harness the relative few resources that that position confers to protect
ordinary hard-working families, young people and some of the most vulnerable in
this country from the damage the Tories are about to inflict. And Labour now also needs
a gain of almost 100 seats to win a bare majority, not far from the 145 seat
surge we last achieved in 1997. But if we spend the next five years doing all
of the above, and more, we can stop the bleeding. If Labour picks a winner this
time as leader, regains its reputation for economic competence, fundamentally
changes its ethos towards England and wins a 2017 EU referendum as Tories
default into infighting, then it can win. Millions of lives count on it.
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